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Abstract 
Persistent uncertainty about the future of the Renewable Fuel Standard led to an analysis of the 
policy’s language and the varying degrees of political support for the program in the Senate. 
Applying probabilities to the various conceived scenarios resulted in a 40% change that the 
program continues in its current form in perpetuity. The report finds that a Democratic Congress 
would implement legislation that focuses on the policy’s missed environmental goals. 
Conversely, a Republican Congress would lead to the most uncertainty in the market due to 
competing views of the RFS within the program. With a narrow Republican majority, legislation 
that limits ethanol and advances the environmental goals could be achieved as a compromise 
between the two parties. As a hedge against federal regulatory uncertainty, state and local 
incentives for biodiesel are considered. Las Vegas, Nevada emerges as a top destination for a 
biodiesel producer.  
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Introduction 
The state of Iowa’s 3.16 million people may make up less than 1% of the United States of 
America’s total population, but they command an outsized voice in national politicsi. When Iowa 
speaks, politicians must listen because the rural state is the first to hold caucuses for Presidential 
electionsii. As it happens, Iowans are the country’s largest producers of corniiiand second largest 
producers of soybeansiv, a fact that keeps all Federal agriculture-related policies on the mind of 
the state’s citizens.  
 This is the context that then-Presidential candidate and Senator Marco Rubio found 
himself in when he was asked about biofuels on November 24, 2015, in Grinnell, Iowa. In the 
audience was a farmer who thanked Senator Rubio for stating that he supported the Renewable 
Fuel Standard until its “expiration” in 2022. Rubio responded by making his opposition to 
government established portfolios clear, but quickly clarified his view that “People have gone 
out and made investments based on existing laws. I think it would be unfair to yank it away in 
the middle. [The RFS] should be allowed to continue until it expires [in 2022].”v  
 Nobody in the audience (nor in another audience where he explicitly called 2022 the 
expiration of RFS) seemed to adversely react to Rubio’s choice of words. Since neither an 
assembly of farmers nor a hopeful Presidential candidate recognized that the policy language 
dictates a perpetual continuation of the RFS, it should come as no surprise that many in industry 
seem confused about the program’s path after 2022.  
 Indeed, the Renewable Fuel Standard’s future is inherently mired in uncertainty due to 
the white canvas the policy grants an acting EPA Administrator beginning in 2023. Floating 
rumors and misguided claims throughout the industry have compounded this uncertainty. 
Whether it be Senator Marco Rubio’s conversations with farmers or my own conversations with 
 
 5 
industry leaders, the persistence of political uncertainty made researching the Renewable Fuel 
Standard an exciting venture. Throughout all of the associated research, three questions kept 
manifesting themselves: 1.) What is going to happen to this legislation after 2022? 2.) Is the 
Renewable Fuel Standard sufficient to incentivize the market behavior policymakers seek? and 
3.) What are the various conceivable scenarios for an RFS 3.0? Everything that follows is my 
best attempt at answering each of these questions.  
After assessing the world of RFS as it is and the world of RFS as it likely will be, this 
report aims to offer a better future for the program. The program’s goals are both important and 
urgent. Predictions of what happens if nothing changes are dire, with Harvard’s James H. Stock 
writing that “With an unreformed RFS and projected declines in gasoline demand, the most 
plausible scenario is one of continued politicization, rising and volatile compliance costs, 
increasing biodiesel imports, flat or declining domestic ethanol sales, and further stagnation of 
domestic second generation technologies.”vi None of these are desired scenarios for the United 
States. It is time to consider what reform should look like and how the stain of political 
uncertainty can be washed away from the Renewable Fuel Standard’s future. Putting forth a 
policy mechanism rooted in the goals of the program that aligns incentives with the desired 
outcomes will set the program on a better path. 
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Understanding the Renewable Fuel Standard 
 Before analyzing the uncertainty around the program’s future, the program itself must 
first be understood. The Renewable Fuel Standard, which dictates that a mandatory minimum 
volume of biofuels must be blended into the United States’ transportation fuel supply each year, 
was established by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct) and expanded by the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA). At its core, the Renewable Fuel Standard’s goals 
are “to enhance energy security through additional domestic production of biofuels, to support 
rural economies, and to promote second generation transportation fuels with low life cycle 
greenhouse gas footprints.”vii The policy mechanism through which these goals are meant to be 
accomplished is the mandated Renewable Volume Obligations that must be blended into the 
country’s transportation fuel supply; these are increasingly ambitious annual volume targets for 
the blending of biofuels. Refiners and petroleum product importers are required to either blend 
biofuels into their supplies or purchase Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs) to demonstrate 
compliance with Renewable Volume Obligations. EPA offers the best explanation for this design 
structure: “EPA calculates and establishes RVOs every year through rulemaking, based on the 
CAA volume requirements and projections of gasoline and diesel production for the coming 
year. The standards are converted into a percentage and obligated parties must demonstrate 
compliance annually.”viii 
 The program works by attaching a RIN to each produced gallon of renewable fuel. The 
RIN gets separated from the renewable fuel once the fuel is blended into a petroleum product. 
For example, corn ethanol that demonstrates at least a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions gets awarded a D6 RIN (there are different RIN codes for different biofuels). The D6 
RIN gets separated once the ethanol is blended into gasoline. Refiners must either blend biofuels 
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into their petroleum products or purchase RINs in the market to meet established Renewable 
Volume Obligations. This market system functions by allowing the RIN value to float enough to 
encourage additional production when the market appears to be falling short of blending 
mandates. At the same time, the market mechanism theoretically allows for the RIN price to 
collapse when renewable fuel blending exceeds mandates. High volatility and compliance costs 
in this market are a central part of reform proposals and will be addressed in detail during this 
report’s reform section. The graphic below illustrates how RINs are generated, separated, and 
purchased. 
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In order to guide the market towards accomplishing a trio of policy goals, the EISA 
designates cellulosic biofuel, biomass-based diesel, advanced biofuel, and renewable fuel as four 
nested fuel categories within the program. Each of these fuels have their own compliance 
benefits; i.e. some can be counted for multiple fuel types whereas some, like ethanol, can be 
classified as a renewable fuel only. Central to the architecture of the nested structure is the 
understanding that different biofuels fulfill different policy goals. Ethanol could be a boom for 
the agricultural economy of America without producing much of an environmental benefit. 
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Cellulosic biofuels can reduce greenhouse gas emissions of our country’s energy portfolio; at the 
same time, biomass-based diesel could work to solve all three policy goals depending on how 
indirect land use change is accounted for. Future changes in the policy can be anticipated by 
understanding which of the policy goals hold equal or greater prevalance than they did in 2007. 
From here, working backwards can reveal which biofuels will receive the greatest political 
support in the reform process.
 
Here, it could be concluded already that the program aligns the incentives of the RINs 
market with the extent to which policy goals are achieved. Conventional wisdom suggests that 
EISA achieves incentive alignment by creating different classes of RINs based on differing 
greenhouse gas emission reduction thresholds. This becomes a focus later in the report, but it is 
worth stating here that the program only achieves this to a prohibitively low extent. Although 
RINs are currently earned by reaching a greenhouse gas reduction threshold, there is no incentive 
for reducing emissions beyond the threshold. Critics might suggest that awarding renewable 
diesel 1.6 RINs per gallon is a way of achieving this, but here the award is once again based 
solely on reaching the stated threshold. Moreover, reviewing the current literature on the 
environmental impacts of ethanol production suggests the Renewable Fuel Standard may have 
had no net positive environmental benefit at all.  
 The Renewable Fuel Standard’s exact policy language in the Energy Independence and 
Security Act stops dictating specific Renewable Volume Obligations after 2022. This part of the 
RIN Code Fuel Type Qualifies For
GHG 
Reduction 
Threshold
D3 Cellulosic Biofuel Cellulosic Biofuel, Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel 60%
D4 Biomass-based Diesel Biomass-based Diesel, Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel 50%
D5 Advanced Biofuel Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel 50%
D6 Renewable Fuel Renewable Fuel 20%
D7 Cellulosic Diesel Cellulosic Biofuel, Advanced Biofuel, Renewable Fuel 60%
 
 10 
policy sits at the core of industry’s uncertainty about what the program will look like in 2023 and 
beyond. In fact, many industry participants even have (or have had) the mistaken belief that the 
program reaches its sunset in 2022. David Cox, General Counsel for the Renewable Natural Gas 
Coalition, wrote publicly of the dangers of misinformation in the market about RFS: “Every day, 
fuel procurement, project financing and infrastructure investment decisions are heavily 
influenced by misinformation… Harmful reports of a 2022 RFS expiration persist.”ix 
Conversations with industry participants – those who trade the fuel, those who produce those 
fuel, and especially those who procure the feedstock – confirmed the pervasiveness of 
misinformation. This, of course, is easy to clarify: The Renewable Fuel Standard does not sunset 
in 2022.  
 What proves much harder to clear up is persistent uncertainty about what a perpetual 
continuation really looks like. This results from the fact that the policy reads as if it was written 
by somebody intending to be vague, stating that “the purposes of subparagraph (A), the 
applicable volumes of each fuel specified in the tables in clause (i) for calendar years after the 
calendar years specified in the tables shall be determined by the Administrator, in coordination 
with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of Agriculture.”x These unelected officials (each 
is an appointed position) are not allowed to pull numbers out of thin air and deem them the 
Renewable Volume Obligations, however. The Administrator cannot legally remove the program 
from existence without legitimate cause, even though the EPA’s website mentions that “the 
statute also contains a general waiver authority that allows the Administrator to waive the RFS 
volumes, in whole or in part, based on a determination that implementation of the program is 
causing severe economic or environmental harm.”xi This “waiver authority” compounds market 
uncertainty for years beyond 2022 and gives the appearance that the political leanings of an 
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administrator could dictate policy. However, the policy dictates that the EPA Administrator’s 
rulemaking be grounded in a fairly specific process.  
The Administrator’s RVO rulemaking must be based on “a review of the implementation 
of the program during calendar years specified in the tables.”xii In other words, the previous 
years with mandated volumes must, by law, be instructive in setting annual volume obligations.  
The second component of what the EPA Administrator must do in determining annual volume 
obligations is analyze six different factors: how renewable fuels will impact the environment; 
how renewable fuels will impact the country’s energy security; expected production rates of 
renewable fuels in the future; how renewable fuels will impact infrastructure in the United States 
and how compatible infrastructure in the United States is with renewable fuels; how renewable 
fuels will impact consumers at the pump; and how renewable fuels will effect rural and 
agricultural economies. The Renewable Fuel Standard’s original goals of energy security, 
environmental protection, and rural economic support are at the core of what the Administrator 
must consider in setting Renewable Volume Obligations. These three pillars are the goals that 
will be evaluated to determine what the future must be based on. 
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 There are a few further limitations imposed by the law, such as requiring all biomass-
based diesel volumes never slipping below 1 billion gallons (the amount set for 2012, the last 
year with specific biomass-based diesel mandates). While a floor exists for biomass-based diesel, 
a ceiling exists for corn ethanol and other conventional biofuels: 15 billion gallons per year 
(illustrated in the chart belowxiii). As for timing, the Administrator is required to announce RVOs 
at least 14 months in advance of the applicable period for biomass-based diesel. Assuming this 
rule is followed, this should impose at least some limit on RIN market volatility (addressed later) 
as transparency in 2021 and 2022 can lead to efficient trading in 2023.  
The set-up in its current forms still allows for a fair degree of speculation as to how EPA 
will approach RFS for years beyond those with specific mandates. In its current form, the 
Renewable Fuel Standard requires EPA to evaluate the program’s goals and set renewable 
volume obligations in a manner conducive to achieving those goals in the future, as informed by 
the understanding of the program’s history. Determining, then, if the RFS achieved its goals (and 
Table 1 Weaver Presentation: How Do RINs Work? 
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whether these goals are still relevant) is of preeminent importance. Any understanding of what 
Renewable Volume Obligations will look like hinges upon how the Administrator assesses the 
six analytical pillars outlined in the policy. To emulate this process, the program’s success 
against its three main goals is weighed to consider how an apolitical EPA Administrator would 
act. Forecasting the policy priorities and political leanings of a specific EPA Administrator fell 
beyond the scope of this report. This is not to say that the perception of RFS’s goal attainment 
will not vary by who sits at the helm of the EPA. Rather, it is meant to be an apolitical 
assessment of the RFS’s ability to achieve its goals since inception. Adjustments to the analysis 
can be made after obtaining future clarity about who the future administrator will be. 
In addition to allowing entry into the thought process of any acting administrator, such an 
analysis will also lead to policy recommendations for any RFS re-write. Many industry 
participants and RFS Stakeholders mentioned that Congress would probably act in 2023 (the 
optimistic among those interviewed did not assign a timeframe) to rewrite RFS to avoid leaving 
complete control of the program to the Executive Branch. Understanding what this rewrite could 
look like requires formulating a view on the program’s ability to obtain its goals and on how 
Congress will act in different scenarios. Analyzing the Senate vote-by-vote, which is taken as a 
proxy for the Congressional composition as a whole, informs what the complicated politics of 
RFS indicate is most likely to occur. 
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The Patina of Success 
Many politicians and industry participants are quick to point to the program’s successes, even as 
others look at the program as a “flop.” Former Montana Senator Jim Talent is among the 
advocates, arguing in August 2018 that “The RFS has achieved its objectives; in fact, it may be 
the one federal energy policy which actually has worked.”xiv Irrespective of which goals were or 
were not satisfied, there can be no denying that the Renewable Fuel Standard dramatically 
accelerated the growth of renewable 
fuels production. The Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) 
releases data on the monthly 
production of biofuels (measured in 
trillions of British Thermal Units) 
in the United States. This data 
demonstrates that biofuel production only experienced the bulk of its exponential growth after 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, as shown 
above. As far as the increasing the production of biofuels is concerned, the Renewable Fuel 
Standard looks like a resounding success. 
This growth should not come as a surprise as it is not rooted in magical leaps in 
technology but in fundamental economic theory. Conventional economic wisdom holds that 
when price increases supply should also increase. If a good’s value jumps, producers of the good 
will likely be able to produce more of the good. Why should corn ethanol or biomass-based 
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diesel be any different? The chart to 
the right illustrates this realityxv. 
Adding the value of RINs to a 
biofuel necessarily makes it more 
economical to produce, as they 
dictate a new mandated point on the 
demand curve. The RIN value 
should, in theory, bridge the gap 
between the supply and demand 
points resulting from a mandate. Point QME, where the large gap in price between the forced 
quantity demanded and quantity supplied is compensated for by the RIN value, illustrates this 
point. It should come as no shock, then, that biofuels production increased since the program’s 
inception.  
Regardless of whether the growth is a result of the added value created by RINs or from 
an advancement of technology, the scorecard of growth in renewable fuels in the aggregate reads 
favorably for the Renewable Fuel Standard program. President of the Renewable Fuels 
Association Bob Dinneen wrote to U.S. News using this exact scorecard as proof that “The RFS 
has been a resounding success in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, decreasing U.S. 
dependence on foreign oil and providing consumers with a cleaner, higher-performing alternative 
at the pump.”xvi Of course, increased domestic production of biofuels does reduce foreign oil 
imports and, depending on which carbon accounting method is used, decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions. Numerous confounding variables, such as ethanol replacing MTBE as gasoline’s 
primary oxygenate additivexvii, exist that offer an alternative explanation for the remarkable 
Figure 1 Sourced from Farm Doc Daily: RIN Economics 
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growth of biofuels production over the last decade. Using growth in biofuels as the sole metric of 
success is akin to assessing a quarterback’s performance solely on the amount of passing yards 
he throws for in a game.  
Critics differ with Dinneen not on the scorecard of aggregate renewable fuels production 
but with the growth’s causation and the lack of growth within portions of the program’s nested 
structure. Examining each of the program’s goals to evaluate performance of the Renewable Fuel 
Standard will paint a better picture of how an acting EPA Administrator might rationally 
determine RVO in 2023 after evaluating prior years’ performance against goals. The nested 
structure of the program complicates the evaluation process, thereby making an assessment of 
the performance of policy goals the most efficient means of evaluating the program at large. By 
choosing to settle on a myopic assessment of the Renewable Fuel Standard’s performance, 
policymakers would misplace incentives and direct the market in a direction that runs counter to 
the policy’s actual goals. This is not a mistake the United States can afford to make; 
consequently, the performance of the program against each of its goals must be fully examined. 
Policy Goal 1: Increase Energy Security 
The twin oil price shocks of the 1970’s coupled with concerns of Peak Oil Theory 
imbued fears of energy insecurity into the psyche of American citizens. Long lines and higher 
prices at the pump coupled with an increased portion of the country’s energy supplies coming 
from nations that are hostile to our own amplified these fears. In line with this mentality, 
President George W. Bush warned of America’s oil addiction in his 2006 State of the Union 
Addressxviii. President Barack Obama, standing on the opposite end of the political spectrum as 
Bush, also spoke about energy security concerns in considerable depth during a speech at 
Georgetown University in 2011, saying “the situation in the Middle East implicates our energy 
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security.xix” The parallel in quotes from two ideologically opposed administrations underscores 
the bipartisan nature of energy security concerns. It logically follows that the Renewable Fuel 
Standard requires the EPA Administrator to assess impacts on energy security when formulating 
future Renewable Volume Obligations. This calculus changes if the relevance of energy security 
as a national issue underwent a paradigmatic shift since the Bush and Obama days. 
Defining energy security is itself a difficult task, especially as the world becomes 
increasingly interconnected. The International Energy Agency attempts to define the term as 
meaning “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.xx” Based on this 
definition, both price and accessibility are variables that must be considered in an assessment of 
the Renewable Fuel Standard’s aim to increase energy security. Does this mean the program 
should be judged on how low oil prices have fallen since inception? What is an “affordable” 
price? For whom must the price be affordable? Entire books are written on the inherent volatility 
of crude oil prices, a reality of market fundamentals that render price an unfair judge of the 
program’s success.  
The IEA’s usage of the term “uninterrupted availability” better lends itself to 
quantitatively analyzing energy security.  Perhaps the best proxy for assessing energy security, 
then, is the Energy Information Administration’s petroleum import data. After all, the only way 
to ensure an uninterrupted supply of energy is sourcing it from within the country’s borders. 
Comparing the increase in ethanol production since the inception of the Renewable Fuel 
Standard against the change in petroleum imports over the same time period will reveal to what 
extent the program increased energy security. 
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 Looking at the data suggests that growth in ethanol production helped bring down total 
crude oil and petroleum products 
imports. Shown graphically, 
right, imports have enjoyed 
consistent annual declines since 
the debut of the Renewable Fuel 
Standard. The relationship 
between the two holds up 
mathematically as well: the 
correlation coefficient between 
the two data sets comes in at -
.8577. At this point, skepticism should pour in. How could ethanol, whose 2011 to 2012 year-
over-year growth is just 16,000 kb, be responsible for a 295,000 kb decline in total oil and 
products imports? Even though the correlation looks strong, causation does not logically follow 
due to the order of magnitude difference in annual changes for the two data series. One ethanol 
barrel cannot displace 10 oil barrels. 
As a result of this mismatch in orders of magnitude, the Renewable Fuel Standard cannot 
be concluded as being responsible for 
the strengthening of energy security, or 
at least not for 90% of the decline in 
imports since the program’s inception. Recent breakthroughs in the domestic extraction of 
hydrocarbons from shale rock through a combination of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal 
drilling distort any study of how the Renewable Fuel Standard impacted energy security. These 
Correlation Between Imports, Crude 
Production -0.8819
Correlation Between Imports, 
Ethanol -0.8578
Data Sets Analysis
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breakthroughs and the associated resurgence in U.S. petroleum extraction are far more 
responsible for making our energy supply more secure than the Renewable Fuel Standard. This, 
too, holds up mathematically with a -.8819 correlation coefficient between crude oil production 
and petroleum imports. There is also alignment in the respective orders of magnitude. 
 Of the many consequences of the United States’ newfound ability to extract vast 
quantities of oil and natural gas, the diminishing weight of energy security concerns in policy 
discussions holds particular importance here. Senators from states indifferent to farming incomes 
and skeptical of climate change could at least potentially be swayed to cast a vote in favor of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard due to energy security concerns in the past. The aforementioned 
former Senator Jim Talent falls into precisely this category, having launched Americans for 
Energy Security and Innovation, which will “focus its efforts on building support for a stronger 
RFS to reduce our dependence on foreign oil from unfriendly nations.”xxi Now, however, this 
policy concern stands largely addressed by a market development that occurred totally 
independent of the program. Adversarial oil-producing behemoths no longer necessitate the 
energy security goal of the Renewable Fuel Standard. 
The policy goal attainment looking like a resounding success story of the Renewable Fuel 
Standard to only be uprooted by the analysis of a confounding variable is par for the course with 
the Renewable Fuel Standard. Later, the reduction in U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions will 
follow this same pattern. Understanding the real drivers of policy goal attainment (or, failure) 
leads to the final conclusion that an impartial administrator will focus on setting goals that 
continue to advance rural incomes and decrease greenhouse gas emissions.  
Taking a cue from the rhetoric of current Energy Secretary Rick Perry would completely 
remove the energy security goal from the policy language of the RFS, “An energy dominant 
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America will export to markets around the world, increasing our global leadership and our 
influence.”xxii Indeed, Secretary Perry and the Administration at large are focused on energy 
dominance, not energy security, manifesting that the energy security policy goal was 
accomplished almost by accident by something that runs counterintuitively to the RFS. As such, 
any new version of RFS will have to be focused on the other two main goals, to the extent that 
they each remain relevant. The diminishing concern about energy security requires that any new 
RFS be rooted in either advancing rural economies or achieving GHG reductions. 
Policy Goal 2: Advance Rural Economies and Farm Incomes 
The policy’s goal to assist the nation’s farmers through price support brought on by increased 
demand can be evaluated in a multitude of ways. For the purposes of this paper, farm incomes 
are seen as the best evaluative tool as this is the actual amount of income earned by farmers in 
rural America. To be truly conclusive, using net lift to farm incomes by deploying models that 
backed out probable crop prices without the Renewable Fuel Standard would be required.  As 
this falls outside the boundaries of what this paper seeks to accomplish, data from the USDA is 
utilized as a proxy.  
Here, net farm incomes are seen as declining ever since 2013, suggesting that the RFS 
needs to continue in order to achieve the rural income goal. There should still be no denying that 
the Renewable Fuel Standard assisted farmers since its inception as the core of the program 
involves increasing demand for corn and soybean oil. Imagine, for a moment, just how steep the 
decline in incomes would have been without the RFS. Conventional economic wisdom dictates 
that increased demand leads to increased prices. To confirm the value of the RFS to rural 
America, Iowa State University (ISU) researchers developed tractable multi-market equilibrium 
models that reached a conclusion that the program does indeed support the agricultural economy. 
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The study estimates a corn price without RFS and with 2022 mandates of $2.75/bu and $3.88/bu, 
respectively. The study runs the same analysis for soybean oil and arrives at a price of 21.17 
cents per pound without RFS and 27.81 cents per pound based on a 2022 mandate estimatexxiii. 
According to this analysis farmers would receive 23-29% less revenue for their crops without the 
RFS mandates! 
Farmers themselves are among the loudest proponents of the program, as evidenced by 
the National Corn Growers Association’s 
comment that states “Rural America 
supported President Trump last year, now 
we need the President to support rural 
America. Supporting policy changes that 
undermine the RFS will hurt farmers, 
renewable fuel plant workers, and rural 
America.”xxiv   This quote and ISU study 
highlight the importance of the RFS to farmers by showing how much price support the RFS 
provides to agriculture markets. As such, the policy goal of providing support to rural America 
and the agriculture industry was certainly achieved by the RFS, as it theoretically should, given 
the demand mandates. Whether more support is or is not needed to maintain the livelihoods of 
these groups and communities cannot be inferred from the previously mentioned data. 
Nonetheless, the agriculture industry – whose voice rings loudly in Washington – certainly 
claims that continued or greater support is indeed needed to placate farmers in America.  
This goal will necessarily be a key focus of the Administrator in 2023. If the Trump 
Administration still holds power, this goal will be ever-so central to the RFS as the 
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Administration has had to place major Band-Aids on the trade war wounds of rural America 
through innovative vehicles such as a $12 billion aid packagexxv. The Administration needs to 
maintain its political capital with farm states following the trade war’s consequences and the 
RFS is one area that can deliver the relief the agriculture community craves. 
In many of my phone calls with former EPA officials and industry participants the future 
of biomass-based diesel was debated. For example, in an RFS re-write, an olive branch could be 
extended to big oil where biomass-based diesel targets would be removed (or at least relaxed) 
from the policy language and ethanol targets remain.  
This report holds a view that such a compromise is fundamentally at odds with what will 
be politically required of any elected officials in 2023 and beyond. Asides from being an 
egregious move away from the policy’s environmental goals, such a compromise would hurt 
some of the nation’s most vulnerable farmers. Soy farmers in America already ailing from the 
Chinese Trade War would be further damaged by removing biomass-based diesel targets from 
the Renewable Fuel Standard. Plus, soy cannot be so easily dismissed as it was reported that it 
would surpass corn in amount of domestic acreage in March 2018 for the first time in 35 
years
xxvii
xxvi. Recently, a Bloomberg report deepened the market-forced marriage between politicians 
and the agriculture community by concluding that “If history is any guide, the trade war with 
China will have lasting affects for U.S. farmers and their soybean crops that the president won’t 
be boasting about.”  
Farmers have been vocal in stating their concerns over recent evolutions in the RFS such 
as the rise in small refinery exemptions under former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt. Purdue 
University economist Wallace Tyner summarized rural America’s worries by saying that farmers 
“thought they were voting for an administration that was supportive of rural America.”xxviii This 
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may seem to simply be another manifestation of American’s evolved relationship with 
government, one Michael Lewis covers in The Fifth Risk through a quote from a former NOAA 
leader who said that “The sense of identity as Citizen has been replaced by Consumer. The idea 
that government should serve the citizens like a waiter or concierge, rather than in a collective 
good sense.” What makes this case more pressing than just reflecting this evolution is that 
farmers’ perceptions of how the Federal government handled the Renewable Fuel Standard will 
be crucial in deciding who wins control of the White House in future elections.  
States that flipped from voting for the Democratic Presidential Candidate in 2012 to now-
President Donald Trump in 2016 are shaded in the darker red with diagonal lines running 
through it in the map on the right of the below graphic. The fact that these states align neatly 
with the states who are decidedly pro-RFS in the attached Senate analysis spells trouble for any 
President trying to win reelection without supporting rural economies. Analyzing Senate 
support for the RFS and aligning it with the Electoral College map limits Congress’s ability 
to make meaningful downward revisions to the policy, as any political party seen as being 
hostile to the interests of the agriculture community could quickly have the Electoral 
College map flipped against them.   
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 All this serves to shed light on the future of RFS: farmers will continue to receive the aid 
they desire. Outright continuation of the RFS in at least some form is almost guaranteed, 
irrespective of how Congress does or does not act to rewrite the legislation. That is the reality of 
the politics. Politically important states on the above graphic are the same states that need the 
Renewable Fuel Standard the most. Consequently, it seems likely that support for ethanol at 15 
billion gallons a year will remain, as should the floor for biomass-based diesel of 1 billion 
gallons. If any major change should come to biomass-based diesel as a result of rural income 
concerns, it will be an upward revision as opposed to an outright elimination.  
Still, ethanol is the most at-risk of being axed from any future Renewable Future 
Standard as it is widely believed that the fuel’s oxygenate blending properties can shield it from 
any demand loss in the event of mandates being erased. University of Illinois Economist Scott 
Erwin echoes this view, arguing that “If the law changed tomorrow and gasoline companies were 
free to ignore ethanol, they'd almost certainly keep right on blending ethanol into their fuel.”xxix 
In a compromise between the agriculture and petroleum lobbies, ethanol could be accounted for 
through some other policy mechanism outside the RFS while biomass-based diesel mandates live 
on. 
Figure 2 Chart on Left Built from Senate Analysis 
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 As such, any compromise to appease farmers accustomed to the added crop value 
provided by RINs would have to rely heavily on providing support to the biodiesel market rather 
than the ethanol market. Farmers might want incentives across the board, but achieving the other 
goals of the Renewable Fuel Standard requires a transition away from ethanol.  
Program Failures and Policy Goal #3 
Despite the astronomical growth of biofuels following the implementation of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard, critics have reason to be skeptical of the Renewable Fuel Standard 
success narrative put forth by Dinneen and Talent. Among the critiques is the refrain that the 
outsized majority of the growth comes from corn ethanol, a fuel that satisfies the RFS goal of 
supporting rural economies but at an uncertain cost to the environmentxxx. Any potential claim 
that the RFS succeeded in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a meaningful quantity was 
uprooted by the National Climate Assessment’s recent conclusion that “Without substantial and 
sustained global mitigation and regional adaptation efforts, climate change is expected to cause 
growing losses to American infrastructure and property and impede the rate of economic growth 
over this century.”xxxi 
On top of that, the growth in cellulosic biofuels would not even appear on the same linear 
scale as ethanol growth in a chart with a single Y-Axis. It was only after the EPA allowed for 
Renewable Natural Gas from biomass to qualify as an approved pathway that any noticeable 
cellulosic fuel growth materialized. If the program was created, in part, to transition away from 
fuels that create GHGs and limit the use of food-competing fuels, critics use the below analysis 
to call the program a failure. 
Even as the United States decreased greenhouse gas emissions in the aggregate, the 
Renewable Fuel Standard is not currently applauded by environmental groups. This results from 
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the fact that declines in the power sector are the reason for the recent decline in the country’s 
GHG reductions. In fact, in late 2017, as the power sector benefited from the displacement of 
coal generation with cleaner-burning natural gasxxxii, transportation replaced the power sector as 
being the largest greenhouse gas emitting sector of the economy. This is the complete opposite of 
what the RFS was designed to achieve. Looking at a chart of greenhouse gas emissions from 
gasoline consumption versus coal reveals that it is the increasingly declining coal emissions 
coming down that is largely responsible for the United States reducing its overall carbon 
footprint since 2006. Gasoline emissions, however, were hardly reduced.  
 
The Renewable Fuel Standard hardly resulted in any tangible benefit to the environment, 
then, especially when considering that the accounting merits of ethanol lifecycle emissions are 
still debated and other environmental concerns have been raised. Former California 
Congressman Henry Waxman tore into the environmental side of the Renewable Fuel Standard, 
stating that “I supported the admirable environmental goals of the RFS when we created it 10 
years ago. Now, it’s clear that the RFS has been a net-negative for the environment. Not only has 
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the RFS failed to spur significant development of truly advanced fuels, but conventional biofuels 
like corn ethanol and soy biodiesel are destroying wildlife habitat at home and abroad, polluting 
waterways, and increasing global warming pollution.”xxxiii   
Dispelling the narrative that the Renewable Fuel Standard has been an unflinching 
success requires looking no further than the actual production of fuels other than ethanol. The 
original mandate for 2017 advanced cellulosic fuel production was 5.5 billion gallons; yet, just 
10 million gallons were produced. The technology that was supposed to come is still stuck in 
traffic. Fuels that were supposed to deliver the greenhouse gas emission reductions did not come, 
even as ethanol production took off. Compounding the environmental woes of repeated mandates 
misses is the fact that “between 2008 and 2012, farmers plowed under more than 7 million acres 
of habitat, mostly to plant corn and soy. That led to the release of carbon pollution equivalent to 
the annual emissions of 20 million additional cars on the road,” as written by David DeGennaro 
of the National Wildlife Federationxxxiv. This speaks to former Congressman Waxman’s view 
that the RFS not only failed to help the environment, but hurt it in the process of seeking the 
advancement of rural incomes.  
The list of environmental problems associated with the Renewable Fuel Standard runs on, 
with the Competitive Enterprise Institute recently writing that: “There is 
considerable evidence (including a recent report from EPA itself) that pristine grasslands, 
especially in the upper Midwest, have been converted to grow corn used to make ethanol.”xxxv 
And yet, the program marches on, undisturbed. At the same time as it fails to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions in the way the program originally set out to, the Renewable Fuel Standard appears 
to be causing myriad environmental damages while the other policy goals are pursued with force. 
Curbing these issues and properly incentivizing reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are 
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crucial pillars to allow any foundation of a future Renewable Fuel Standard to stand on solid 
environmental ground. The original environmental goals are both unachieved and still relevant, 
demanding they be a central consideration in any future change to the program.  
Now a cliché, Einstein’s original articulation that labeled insanity “doing the same thing 
over and over and expecting different results” applies to the environmental goal of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard over time. Hoping the Renewable Fuel Standard will guide the market 
to a promised land of clean, renewable fuels requires faith -- belief without evidence – because 
the facts suggest it simply has not worked. As such, either a greater incentive or completely 
reimagined RFS will be required to deliver on the environmental goals of the legislation.  Rep. 
Peter Welch and Senator Tom Udall introduced bills into the house and senate in March 2018 
that would phase out the ethanol mandate and introduce an incentive to protect land from being 
used in agriculture production. Though this bill is not seen as likely to pass, the appetite among 
Congressmen to revise the RFS in order to ensure its environmental goals are reached speaks 
volumes about the future of the legislation. What, specifically, reform will look like given the 
lack of environmental improvements created by RFS 2.0 is the focus of the remainder of the 
report. 
What Reform Can and Should Be 
There are many competing thoughts on what reform of the Renewable Fuel Standard 
should look like, and the politics of the legislation are extraordinarily complicated. The analysis 
of policy goals in this report suggests that reform requires increasing incentives for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions from transportation fuels, maintaining some level of support for rural 
economies, and rethinking the ethanol mandate. In an ideal world, Congress should construct a 
program that mandates biodiesel, renewable diesel, and advance biofuels blending without any 
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regard for ethanol blending. Ethanol demand already derives support from its aforementioned 
benefits as an octane enhancer in gasoline. Mandating its blending is akin to creating a law that 
rewards humans for consuming calories. If a behavior would happen without the presence of a 
policy, why subsidize it? 
To increase the odds of passing legislation that satisfies enough interested parties, an RFS 
3.0 is devised below that features two classes of RINs, one for ethanol (with the caveat that an 
ethanol phase-out should be instituted so long as the voting structure of Congress allows it to 
pass) and one for all other biofuels. In the reimagined RIN awarding process, all fuels are 
assessed based on their greenhouse gas emission reductions and measured against the same 
metric for ethanol in the RIN awarding process. The greater the lifecycle GHG emissions 
reduction against ethanol, the greater the reward. Here, the actual desired outcome -- greenhouse 
gas emission declines -- is properly incentivized. Awarding RINs based on the achieved 
emissions reduction against ethanol ensures the market will transition to more environmentally-
friendly fuels. At the same time, maintaining the incentive for biomass-based diesel will continue 
to lend support to rural economies.  
 One of the common arguments from Senators is that the nature of RIN trading needs to 
be changed due to high compliance costs and unpredictable costs created by the volatility of the 
RINs market. In some circles, capping the RIN price is synonymous with Renewable Fuel 
Standard reform. Texas Senator Ted Cruz stands at the center of this circle with a constant 
request for a 10 cent price cap on RINsxxxvi.  It is worth noting, however, that any artificial cap 
on RINs prices is not viewed as a feasible solution to the challenges the Renewable Fuel 
Standard faces. Real reform requires moving beyond a price cap and restructuring the program to 
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more closely align with its policy goals. Doing this satisfies those wanting more predictable 
compliance costs by removing layers of political uncertainty, as discussed below. 
Capping the cost of compliance would distort market signals and impede the policy’s 
abilities to achieve its goals; if compliance is not occurring, prices have to respond accordingly. 
Though it may be politically popular in petroleum products-producing states, a cap would hurt 
the very farmers that politicians now have to try desperately to help amid a trade war that has 
hurt rural America. This is not to say that reform should not include any adjustment to the 
market’s overall structure; any market structure not achieving its policy goals should not be left 
to its own devices in perpetuity. Rather, it is the actual cause of missed policy goals that must be 
handled.  
The real problem with RIN price volatility is not that prices are allowed to float freely but 
that the administrative body often sends distorted signals to the market and the price is not 
indexed to the extent to which any individual RIN achieves policy goals. One day, the 
administration waives small refineries from needing to comply with the Renewable Fuel 
Standard; the next, the President will speak on the need to permit year-round sales of E15 (a 
gasoline blend containing 15% ethanol). This flip-flopping in the political approach to renewable 
fuels disrupts the market’s functioning. To address the former of these issues, maintaining 
transparency and limiting political threats should be the priority of political leaders once reform 
passes. Distorting an already complicated market with price controls would only deepen the 
problems with the program as changes in Washington leadership could cause a reversion to a 
fully free market, and hence increased volatility around added political uncertainty. Limiting the 
economic value obtainable from a RIN would also prohibit the program from achieving its own 
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goals as markets would not be able to adjust to incentivize the marginal gallon of renewable fuel 
to be produced.  
Adding price controls to the market would be akin to fighting fire with fire. Increasing 
the government’s presence in the market would lead to increased potential for volatility over 
time. Government’s role in the RFS should be setting mandates, ensuring compliance, and 
providing clear signals about what type of market behavior is desired. Obscuring these signals, 
managing prices, and adding layers of uncertainty hamstring the Renewable Fuel Standard’s 
potential. 
With this in mind, the Renewable Fuel Standard’s future is often painted as one that 
should either be the same as it is today or completely eradicated. If two of the three policy goals 
have not changed, there should be no reason that the debate need be so binary. Neither a 
perpetual continuation nor an outright kill bill should be the proposed solution: calculated reform 
should be the answer. One school of thought for reform was previously mentioned as protecting 
lands; though important, such an amendment is more of a supplement to full RFS reform than it 
is constitutive of reform in and of itself. Land protect is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
of an RFS 3.0. Reform requires reimagining how RINs are awarded and aligning the entire RIN 
generating process with the policy’s goals. 
In order to generate a RIN in the program’s current form, biomass-based diesel must 
meet a 50% lifecycle GHG reduction, cellulosic biofuel must meet a 60% reduction, advanced 
biofuel from biomass (other than corn starch) must meet a 50% GHG reduction, and 
conventional renewable fuel – usually, ethanol – must meet a 20% lifecycle GHG reduction 
threshold. What’s lost in all this is a reward for reductions that exceed the thresholds; currently, 
producers of renewable fuels have no economic incentive under the Renewable Fuel Standard to 
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reduce GHG emissions in excess of the stated requirements for each fuel. Fixing this 
misalignment should take center stage in the reform process, especially given that the 
environmental goals of the program appear to be the furthest from complete of all the program’s 
policy goals.  
After contemplating various reform proposals, I created a high-level organization of the 
RFS that would align the incentive structure more closely with the program’s goals. In this 
structure, two classes of RINs would exist: one that gets awarded to all “renewable” fuel 
production and a second from renewable fuels that achieve greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) 
reductions in excess of conventional ethanol. RIN1, in this sense, could be limited to 15 billion 
gallons per year, thereby artificially limiting the price volatility of RIN1 as it would not qualify 
for RIN2 and therefore not be subject to volatile political changes. RIN2 quantity requirements, 
however, would be assigned an annual mandate based on the desired reduction in the amount of 
greenhouse gas emissions of the United States’ overall transportation fuel mix. The existence of 
RIN1 is solely to ensure a relatively high possibility of passing legislation that included these 
elements.  
In order to generate any RIN2’s a renewable fuels producer would be required to 
demonstrate a proven reduction in greenhouse gas emissions against a conventional ethanol 
baseline in the same way that current greenhouse gas thresholds are evaluated at EPA under RFS 
2.0. In this program, the amount of RINs awarded aligns directly with the amount of greenhouse 
gas reductions achieved by the fuel. Somebody who achieves a 40% reduction in a fuel’s GHG 
reductions would receive twice as many RIN2’s as a producer who achieves a 20% reduction.  
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RIN1 is proposed only 
to earn the Congressional 
votes of ethanol-producing 
states; to fully move the 
program into the new realities 
of the market, the ethanol 
mandate would have to have a 
sunset provision. Analyzing 
the Senate make-up suggests 
that excluding any ethanol 
mandate would sacrifice up to 14 Senate votes whose support for RFS was identified as being 
contingent upon the ethanol mandate. This would send RFS support well below the majority, 
even when counting all remaining “Maybe” votes as “Yes” votes. The inclusion of ethanol also 
satisfies the advancing rural economies goal of the original legislation. It will ultimately be the 
policymakers who decide the fate of the ethanol mandate; the fractured views on the subject 
could result in the killing of the mandate with a compromise for the introduction of some other 
policy mechanism to support ethanol demand.  
Congress establishing desired national GHGs reduction targets for transportation fuels at 
the program’s inception would limit volatility induced by the EPA rulemaking process each year. 
Parties desiring a cap on ethanol RIN prices would be dually satisfied as RINs generated from 
ethanol production would be capped at the current upper limit of 15 billion gallons per year. 
With an artificial supply limitation, the volatility associated with RIN1 prices would be 
suppressed as ethanol is already generated in large quantities to be utilized as a gasoline additive 
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for performance characteristics. With time, Congress could even wind down this portion of the 
“ideal” Renewable Fuel Standard to award only the fuels that achieve a clear environmental 
benefit against ethanol.  
The most important distinguishing factor of this “ideal RFS Reform” is that it neatly 
aligns the market reward with the extent to which a fuel meets a specific policy goal. In former 
Speaker of the House Paul Ryan’s book The Way Forward, he writes “if you tax something, you 
get less of it.” The flipside of this relationship is that if the United States demands more of 
something, it must pay for it. Rewarding each additional percentage reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions will better incentivize investment in clean, renewable fuels. Assigning annual RIN2 
mandates based on percentage reductions in greenhouse gas emissions would also tie the 
theoretical value of a RIN with its value towards achieving a policy goal. Incentivizing 
renewable fuels production of any kind mistakes the means for the end. The end goal is not 
production growth; rather, production growth is a means to the end goals of advancing rural 
economies and reducing the environmental impacts of the transportation sector. 
The first two goals – advancing energy security and supporting rural incomes – are also 
achieved herein as any gallon of a domestically produced renewable fuel continues to be a gallon 
of fuel not imported from potential adversaries and the RIN1 price could serve to maintain rural 
incomes from farming. Additionally, biomass-based diesel must already meet a GHG reduction 
that is larger than the reduction required of ethanol so the RIN2s generated by soy-based 
biodiesel would further compensate farmers. Other policy mechanisms would need to be 
designed should Congress wish to wind down the ethanol mandate with time and still desire 
some form of market assistance for rural economies. At its core, this version of the Renewable 
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Fuel Standard would shift the quantity of a good desired from renewable fuels to reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions from renewable fuels.  
RFS 3.0, as described above, is in line with the policy’s original goals and informed by 
evolutions in goal attainment of the policy over time. It also reflects a level-headed assessment of 
confounding variables that have distorted the extent to which other goals are still needed: ethanol 
as an oxygenate has firmed demand for the fuel independent of the RFS; rapid increases in 
domestic production of fossil fuels have transformed energy independence; and the power 
sector’s shift to natural gas has been the real driver of declining U.S. GHG reductions. 
Transparent, firm, and Congressionally-passed annual GHG reduction mandates will give the 
market the clarity and incentive needed to encourage long-term investment in “next generation” 
renewable fuels.  
California’s LCFS follows a similar structure as the federal program proposed above. 
“The LCFS requires producers of petroleum-based fuels to reduce the carbon intensity of their 
products, beginning with a quarter of a percent in 2011 culminating in a 10 percent total 
reduction in 2020.”xxxvii
xxxviii
 The program administers compliance by requiring carbon producers 
such as refiners to either develop their own low CI fuels or purchase LCFS credits from those 
who do. Indexing credit values to the quantity of the reduction in carbon intensity is an idea 
borrowed from LCFS and one that works with proven success. Even with a few complications 
along its path, the success of the LCFS is well-documented, with an Executive Vice President of 
the Renewable Fuels Association recently saying “It seems like there’s less risk that something 
could go wrong with the LCFS, whereas with the RFS, gosh—it seems like every day we’ve got 
a new headline coming out about some new clandestine, secret effort to undermine the 
RFS.”  
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In James Stock’s “Reforming the Renewable Fuel Standard” paper for Columbia 
University’s SIPA School, he concludes that two of three key legislative reforms of the RFS are 
to “reduce sharply the compliance costs of blending ethanol into E10. This component builds on 
the recognition that ethanol has become the cost-effective choice for octane enhancement” and to 
“transform the second-generation part of the RFS into a technology-pushing program that 
provides reliable, effective, and long-term support for nascent low-GHG renewable fuels, 
regardless of feedstock.”xxxix Both of these goals are central to the RFS 3.0 designed above: by 
attaching RIN generation to the value of GHG reductions, advanced technology is properly 
incentivized by matching the value of the incentive received to every incremental achievement in 
greenhouse gas reductions.  
Compliance costs of blending ethanol also would theoretically come down as the ethanol 
RIN price should adjust to reflect the needed value based on supply and demand fundamentals of 
the market. If supply of ethanol overwhelms demand of RIN1s because of ethanol production 
occurring as a result of octane enhancement demand, the price of RIN1s should drop to a level 
that matches the needed subsidy. With time (and with a Congress that has the political ability to 
withdraw it) the RIN1 could be completely phased out and only greenhouse gas emissions in 
excess of ethanol’s reductions would be rewarded. 
Stock also pinpoints “the small markets for E15 and E85” as a culprit for why volatility 
in the RINs market is so high; additionally, he highlights that “RIN prices are sensitive to rumors 
and market guesses.” Both of these principal concerns are removed by reducing the significance 
of ethanol in the RFS 3.0 and through establish emission reduction goals at the program’s 
inception. All uncertainty associated with the rulemaking process would be eluded through the 
creation of concrete mandates for annual reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. Even though 
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the principal aim of RFS 3.0 would be to better satisfy the missed policy goal of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, it also lends support to rural economies and continues to increase the 
domestic production of renewable fuels. 
What Will Actually Occur: Politics, Politics, Politics 
The reality of the Senate’s current make-up dictates that a reconfiguration of the program 
in 2023 in line with the ideal version outlined above is impossible absent an ideological shift in 
the Senate’s composition. Analyzing each individual Senator’s political comments and voting 
history on RFS-related matters (where available) as of November 1, 2018 reveals that if the 
Renewable Fuel Standard went through a vote in the Senate tomorrow, 54 Senators would vote 
yes, 5 could be made to vote yes if certain compromises are made, and 41 are perceived as voting 
against the Renewable Fuel Standard. Multiple “yes” votes are hinged on strong support for the 
rural income portion of the policy that assists farmers through mandated ethanol demand. 
Enough Senators place a hardline on the ethanol mandate that a pure removal of it from the 
policy would require serious compromise in other areas. 
Looking at each vote in the Senate individually gives a sense of what any “RFS 3.0” 
would look like; such an analysis was necessary as multiple key contacts stated in phone 
interviews that the program will continue as written through 2023, after which the Senate will act 
to wrestle the power to determine mandates away from the EPA Administrator by writing new 
mandates and perhaps a new program entirely.  
 Prior to analyzing how the assumed Congressional composition would vote (it is assumed 
that any RFS that passes through the Senate would duly pass through the House), it is worth 
stating what will occur to the Renewable Fuel Standard in the event that no legislative change 
occurs. This scenario is given a 40% probability of occurring as it is assumed 100% likely that a 
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Democratic-controlled Congress would move to introduce an RFS 3.0, thus no probability is 
attributed to “No Legislative Change” in a Democratic Congress. The odds of a Democratic 
Senate are assumed to be 20%, the odds provided by FiveThirtyEight’s analysis of the 2018 
Senate electionxl. Extrapolating this forward through two elections – 2020 and 2022 – is a rough 
assumption to make but is the best available probability as of now. In the Republican Senate, just 
a 1/8 chance of legislative change was originally assigned, which aligned the proportion of 
Republican with senators who either co-sponsored the RFS Kill-Bill (Heller, Lee, and Barrasso), 
plus those who have outright proposed legislative action to waive the ethanol mandate (Toomey, 
Cruz, Hatch, Enzi, and Boozman.). This was amended to a 50% chance following the recent 
introduction of a bill by Congressmen John Shimkus and Bill Flores; the logic here was to 
include not only the Republican Senators who voted against the ethanol mandate, but also those 
who are definitive yes votes but deemed as potentially liable to compromise on ethanol in favor 
of robust mandates for other fuels. The Shimkus-Flores bill indicates that even those who 
support the RFS in its current form will want to move to institute reform, which amounts to 
roughly 50% of the Republican Senators analyzed (those who could be seen as passionate about 
writing a third version of the Renewable Fuel Standard). 
 As mentioned above, Electoral College fundamentals require a heightened level of 
political support for ethanol-producing states. The Republican Party is likely unwilling to risk the 
support of the four key states that flipped the White House for now-President Donald Trump and 
17 Senators within the party are seen as decidedly Pro-RFS. This split between 17 Senators being 
clearly Pro-RFS and 8 being entirely against the program underpins the assumption that a 
Republican Congress would create the most uncertainty about the future of the program. 
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No Legislative Change  
The resulting tally suggests a 40% likelihood of the “No Legislative Change Scenario;” 
here, the Renewable Fuel Standard rests in the power of the EPA Administrator. The 
Administrator is mandated by the original policy language to consult the history of the program’s 
success in achieving policy goals when determining Renewable Volume Obligations. To the 
extent that the Administrator’s analysis mirrors the one above, there should be no downward 
change to biomass-based diesel blending obligations. At a minimum, biomass-based diesel’s 
mandated blending must exceed 1 billion gallons annually due to a specific requirement in the 
“All Other Calendar Years” section of the EISA of 2007. In the future, ethanol’s ability to 
qualify for total renewable fuels is capped at 15 billion gallons a yearxli, as well. Beyond this, the 
market will have to look at “reset” discussions and annual rulemakings to get a feel for any 
evolution of the advanced cellulosic portion of the RFS. The bottom line remains clear that the 
most likely scenario for RFS in 2023 in this scenario is a near-mirror image of the program in 
2018. This fact contradicts the echoing pains of political uncertainty I unearthed in many of my 
conversations with those involved with the industry. Short-term noise in Washington does not 
translate to structural change in a policy program overnight. 
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The Renewable Future Standard’s Future in a Republican Congress 
In the 80% chance that Republicans control Congress, a small likelihood of changing the 
Renewable Fuel Standard was originally assigned. Now, after a recent draft discussion bill 
released by two Republican Congressmen that would replace the ethanol mandate with a national 
octane specification and tie annual biomass-based diesel mandates to actual annual production, a 
50% probability is assigned. This remains the single most uncertain future scenario for the 
program and it would increase volatility in RIN markets as the party has two groups with 
competing thoughts on what the future of the Renewable Fuel Standard should be. At the risk of 
simplification, the divide is between those from agriculture-producing states versus those from 
either refining states or those who adhere strictly to laissez-faire ideology. As Senator Chuck 
Grassley of Iowa chairs the powerful Judiciary Committee and happens to be perhaps the most 
vocal advocate of the Renewable Fuel Standard, he could wield outsized influence over the 
party. At the same time, 32 different Republican Senators appear to be outright “No” votes for 
any future RFS proposal that holds elements similar to the one passed in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007. This underpins the uncertainty that such a set-up would 
pose if the Senate grows uneasy with the program being in the hands of the Executive Branch in 
2023, a possibility repeatedly brought up in my questioning of industry participants.  
With a Republican Congress and President, the idea of a compromise between the 
agriculture and oil lobbies was also a talking point in my conversations with industry participants 
at the American Fats and Oils Association’s annual meeting. This compromise, some believe, 
would take the view of maintaining the ethanol mandate and phasing out biomass-based diesel 
and advanced cellulosic fuels. As mentioned above, this is viewed as having a near-zero percent 
chance of occurring due to the prevalence of soy acreage in the nation’s farming mix. It would be 
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political suicide for Senators from soy producing states to openly abandon their soy farmers after 
these farmers have already been caught in tariffs associated with the U.S.-China Trade War. 
Getting rid of the biomass-based diesel mandate in favor of keeping the corn ethanol mandate 
would be a redundant way of hurting soy farmers while awarding corn farmers because ethanol 
would likely be blended into gasoline even without the mandate due to its value as an octane 
enhancer. 
The Future of RFS in a Democratic Congress 
The views of the Democratic Party towards the Renewable Fuel Standard are much more 
uniform: use it to advance environmental goals.  The Senators in the Democratic Party who have 
voiced hostility to the RFS have done so almost exclusively to the ethanol portion, with Senator 
Cardin of Maryland mentioning that “Maryland’s large poultry industry has concerns with the 
RFS and how the diversion of 40% of our annual domestic corn crop is being turned into fuel.” 
The resoundingly negative associations with ethanol production from land use change and 
questionability around the accounting for its lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions could put the 
fuel at risk in a Democratic Congress as multiple Congressman have voiced hostility to the 
ethanol mandate’s environmental consequencesxlii. As such, it appears that the proposed, ideal 
scenario for RFS reform has the best chance of having its core elements (namely, limiting 
ethanol growth and properly incentivizing next generation renewable fuel) adopted in a 
Democratic Congress. The odds of this scenario occurring are just 20%, however; adding this 
20% onto the 40% chance of no major legislative change creates a bright future for biomass-
based diesel and renewable diesel. This conclusion is at odds with the conventional wisdom I 
encountered at the conference that spoke of the high potential for cuts to biodiesel. 
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 Overall, it looks like Renewable Fuels producers, farmers, feedstock aggregators, and 
everyone else in the industry will have to accept that certainty exists for the biomass-based diesel 
mandate, but the form the mandate will take remains uncertain. As developments in the 
ideological composition of Congress unfold, the Renewable Fuel Standard Senate tracking tool 
included in this report’s Appendix can be quickly adjusted to reflect any change in the 
probabilistic model of the program’s future. 
The Ideal Spot for a Renewable Fuel Producer: Close to California, Close to 
Feedstocks  
This analysis led to one last question: given the current structure of Congress and the 
Renewable Fuel Standard, where should a producer of biodiesel from used cooking oil, for 
example, locate within the United States? The robustness of California’s Low Carbon Fuel 
Standard coupled with the state’s Cap and Trade program make it a strong home for renewable 
fuels. Illinois was also considered as the ultimate home for such a production facility as 
“Through December 31, 2023, sales and use taxes do not apply to the proceeds from the sale of 
biodiesel blends containing between 11% and 99% biodiesel (B11-B99) or fuels containing 
between 70% and 90% ethanol (E70-E90).”xliii It was California that was selected as the ideal 
location, however, as the LCFS program rewards producers based on the specific Carbon 
Intensity of the feedstock which incentivizes lower CI Feeds such as used cooking oil. Oregon 
and Washington were dually considered but the longevity of the California LCFS made it less 
succumbed to political uncertainty. The recent increase in LCFS Credit prices (shown below) as 
the state strives to meet increasingly aggressive emissions reductions targets heightens the 
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potential of a low carbon intensity feed such as used cooking oilxliv. Since producers are awarded 
based on the lower CI value of used cooking oil, California’s market makes it a valuable feed. 
Demand concerns also led to analyzing specifically California as opposed to Illinois as 
REG 
already 
“[sells] 
approximately 101 million gallons of biomass-based diesel in the state [of Illinois].”xlv Adding to 
this concern was the state’s production profile: “The state is a leading producer of both ethanol 
and biodiesel, with the third-largest production capacity in the nation for ethanol and fourth for 
biodiesel.”xlvi It seemed more worthwhile, then, to examine the economics of selling biodiesel 
from used cooking oil into the California market. Industry participants suggested that doing 
business in the state of California can be both costly and litigious, which led to considering 
nearby states as alternatives; locating a facility close to the feedstock to minimize transportation 
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costs is a lesson gleaned from the ethanol industry, which locates nearly all of its plants close to 
corn production, shown below. 
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 In this process, Nevada jumped out as a state with high potential. Las Vegas, 
specifically, has the feedstock (used cooking oil) nearby and the rail connectivity needed to 
service the California market, as shown below. If feed price differentials in Nevada against 
California and state incentives from the Nevada government outweigh the rail cost, locating the 
facility in the Las Vegas area demonstrates a higher NPV over nine years than a similar 
California facility, all else equal. Relative values are used in the NPV calculation as neither feed 
prices nor exact rail prices could be obtained on campus. The tool allows for the simplistic 
insertion of data obtained from price quotes so industry participants can quickly tweak the model 
to make sure the model’s assumptions match their business’s reality.  
To determine this, all of the variable costs are modeled in a DCF model that allows a user 
to select a state from a drop-down list, which leads to costs automatically adjusting accordingly. 
Certain costs, like rail and state-specific incentives are not possible to model specifically without 
quotes. Here, assumptions are made for differentials between California and Nevada on a 
percentage basis. This allows for the conclusion that the difference in feedstock costs added onto 
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state tax incentives must outweigh the rail cost of sending the feedstock into California. 
Otherwise, the decline in NPV of doing business in Nevada as brought on by the rail leg must be 
viewed as compensated for by avoiding the qualitative costs of building a production plant in 
California (long lead times, highly litigious, etc.).  
 
 The tool, illustrated above, concludes that a combination of state tax incentives and 
qualitative gains of not locating in California must equal roughly ~34 cents per gallon to 
compensate for the added rail cost and maintain the same NPV of the project in Nevada as 
in California. Obtaining such a favorable tax package should not be ruled out given that Nevada 
provided Tesla with $1.3 billion in tax incentives and other benefits to locate its gigafactory 
within the statexlvii.  
Nevada should be considered as a top destination for Renewable Fuels due to Las 
Vegas’s abundance of used cooking oil, proximity to sell into the robust California market, 
appropriate rail connectivity, plus the state’s potential ability to offer a unique set of tax 
incentives to a biodiesel producer. Although no publicly available data for feedstock costs by 
region could be obtained, it seems likely that Las Vegas’s used cooking oil could be on sale 
relative to California’s used cooking oil due to the fact that “Cities with the most fast food 
restaurants per capita… were spread more evenly throughout the country with Orlando, 
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Cincinnati, and Las Vegas in the top three spots.”xlviii The current geography of biodiesel plants, 
shown below, also suggests that any used cooking oil from Las Vegas might be leaving the state 
to other facilities anyhow. This places a producer located closer to the in-state feeds at a 
competitive advantage. The second leg of transportation would still have to be on rail, but this 
criteria is satisfied by the fact that Las Vegas falls on the Union Pacific line into California.  
 
Figure 3 Created using NREL's Biodiesel Atlas 
Concluding Thoughts on the Future 
Analyzing the composition of the Senate and each Senator’s view of the Renewable 
Future Standard revealed just how fractured the politics around RFS really are. Splits within the 
Republican Party decrease the ability to forecast the program’s future with any certainty, yet one 
parallel exists outside of the major corn producing states: hostility to ethanol. Republican 
Senators with no in-state economic incentive to support the ethanol mandate and those with an 
incentive to vehemently oppose it, such as Texas Senator Ted Cruz, tend to hold a principled 
view against the Renewable Fuel Standard’s ethanol mandate. With some Republican Senators 
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making the ethanol mandate the whipping boy of their laissez faire rhetoric and a growing 
environmental concern among Democrats, it is ethanol – not biodiesel – that should be nervous 
for what it is to come in future policy changes. In fact, this is exactly what happened shortly after 
I finalized an early draft of this report. The draft discussion bill recently introduced by 
Congressmen Shimkus and Flores aims to “sunset the conventional biofuel pool under the RFS 
as of 2023”xlix while simultaneously introducing a new RVO setting process that could lead to 
increased growth in biodiesel production.  
 Those bemoaning Renewable Fuel Standard uncertainty have a reason to be exhausted. 
The drama over small refinery exemptions and E15 sent conflicting signals to a market aching 
for leadership out of Washington. Is this administration pro-refiners? Pro-ag? What will happen 
in 2023? These are necessary questions for market participants to ask. But they should not be 
questions that call for a complete sunset of the Renewable Fuel Standard. Perpetual uncertainty, 
though exhausting, is a fundamental reality of any legislation that seeks to satisfy a handful of 
bold policy goals by involving competing parties and technological advancement. In fact, by 
writing in future growth in advanced cellulosic fuels, the program itself was betting on a wide 
range of uncertainties. This uncertainty also creates opportunities for companies that invest in 
understanding the political landscape and specifics of the policy. While nobody at the conference 
I attended spoke about the removal of ethanol mandates in the future as the probable outcome, 
my analysis suggests that it can and should happen. Getting caught in the noise can lead to 
exhaustion whereas analyzing the facts can lead to profit.  
 The reality of uncertainty does not mean industry participants should entirely ignore all 
“noise” from the nation’s capital. Understanding which direction policymakers intend to take the 
Renewable Fuel Standard should underscore the going concern operations of any legitimate 
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business operating in the renewable fuels industry. When the uncertainty at the Federal level 
becomes too much to consider a large-scale capital expenditure in the renewable fuels industry, 
state level legislation can be used as a hedge. The robustness and duration of California’s Low 
Carbon Fuel Standard make its renewable fuels market the ideal home for a producer looking to 
elude political uncertainty, or at least hedge political risk. For industry participants looking to 
avoid locating their primary activities in California, the Las Vegas area was shown to be an 
economical alternative.  
 Whether it be through California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard, recent moves in Congress 
to protect biodiesel, or the understanding provided by analyzing the specific policy language, 
biodiesel’s future in the United States is a bright one. Dim forecasts of doom after 2022 were 
found to be rooted solely in psychological, not political, elements. There are not enough votes in 
the Senate to sunset the Renewable Fuel Standard; ethanol has a home in gasoline regardless of 
the Renewable Fuel Standard; and, perhaps most importantly, the environmental goals of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard are found to have missed their mark by a wide margin. These facts 
suggest that biodiesel will be well-accounted for in any future of the Renewable Fuel Standard. 
Around the beginning of forming my thesis question of “What will happen to the Renewable 
Fuel Standard after 2022?” the industry participants I spoke with asked questions like “will the 
biodiesel mandate exist beyond 2022?” Based on my analysis, the question is no longer an 
existential one, but a quantity one: “to what extent will the biodiesel mandate exist” replaces 
“will it exist?”  
Analyzing the policy’s goals suggests that a weaker version of the biodiesel mandate is 
far less probable than a stronger version, a welcomed outcome for anyone involved in the 
biodiesel industry. We can expect the Renewable Fuel Standard to continue in perpetuity, based 
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on the policy language, and reasonably expect an upward revision to biodiesel and advanced 
biofuels in a left-leaning Congress. In a right-leaning Congress, there are too many competing 
views within the Republican Party to conclude what such a Congress would do to the Renewable 
Fuel Standard. In both Congressional scenarios, the ethanol mandate is greatly at risk, but 
biodiesel and advanced biofuels are very likely to maintain their support. Keeping an eye on the 
dynamic Senate tracking model will be crucial to understand changes in the likely future of the 
Renewable Fuel Standard. 
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